Archive: Primer on China’s Leadership Transition

中国2012权力移交情况预测

核心提示：清华大学的外籍教授对中国政治体制的介绍，以及对中共高层交接班当中值得关注的六名重要人物的介绍。



原文作者：程致宇（Patrick Chovanec），清华大学经济管理学院教授，美国人

原文链接：

http://chovanec.wordpress.com/2011/05/08/primer-on-chinas-leadership-transition/

译者：cys.tony

校对: 南山



在过去的几个月里，有些人写信来要求我关于中国明年即将开始的权力交接做一个简要介绍。新旧国家主席和国务院总理的权力交接在媒体中引起了大量的猜测，人们关注谁会成为新的领导人以及这意味着什么。然而，有时候回顾一些基本原则是非常有用的，因为中国有一个独特的甚至在某些方面看来十分令人迷惑的政治制度。



首要的事情是，要明白政治制度是由三个部分组成的。在美国，我们有行政，立法，司法这三个组成部分。在中国则是党、政、军。和美国的三权分立、彼此平等制衡不一样的是，在中国，党是至高无上的，并且统治着另外两个部分。中国的“领导换届”包括政治体系中三个部分的相互协调的权力交接。









党

这里我说的党，当然是指中国共产党（CPC，或CCP）。这个政治组织在1921年建立，在毛泽东的领导下，进行了一场革命战争，并且最终在1949年上台执政。它是一个列宁式的政党，这意味着与大多数西方政党不同，它是类似于军事单位和宗教团体的一个严密的、等级形的组织。在美国，并没有一个作为共和党或者民主党“党员”的这样一个概念——最接近的应该是登记参加两党中任何一党的党内初选。共和党或者民主党“委员会”，无论是地方级别或者国家级别，只用来筹集资金并且为候选人提供支持和帮助。他们没有能力向选民、活动家、候选人或者当选官员发布号令。与此相反，加入中国共产党则是一种正式和严格选拔的过程，需要花费数年来完成。这个过程一旦启动，成员必须服从党的指示，并且接受党安排的一切任务（包括担任公职）。如果他们胡作非为，或者甚是触犯了法律，他们会被党拘留、调查和处罚，而不是被警方处理——只有被开除党籍之后，他们才会被移交给这个国家的常规司法机构并被起诉。

想了解这个党的最好方法是想象一个庞大跨国公司的人力资源部门。所不同的是，这个人力资源部门是如此强大，它拥有任命所有人包括从董事会和首席执行官到最底层的看门人的权力，因此它能够有效的发号施令。在中国，所有政府部门、军事单位、国有企业——甚至许多私有企业也是一样——都有一个党委会，它决定重大人事问题。通过这种做法，它实际上掌握着实权。有时一些较为公开的单位的负责人同时也会是党委的领导人，这意味着名义上的老板也是实际上发号施令的人。但是如果这两个角色是分开的——比如每个省的领导——那么党委的领导人肯定是掌握实权最多的那个。

这个党的7800万成员（比中国的总人口的百分之五略多），基本上是经过了预先审查的、能够被党的领导层安排到任何职位的候选人群——他们当然明白自己的主要效忠对象是共产党，因为正是党安排了他们的职位。来自党的上级的指令——人事的安排和提拔，或者遵循什么样的政策——绝对比从较为正式的渠道（如政府部门，法院或者企业董事会）获得的指示要重要的多。

每隔五年，共产党会举行一次全国代表大会，这个会议自从1949年以来一直在位于天安门广场的人民大会堂举行。上一届全国代表大会（17届），在2007年10月召开。理论上来说，参加大会的是2000名左右由基层党员选举出来的代表；实际上，这些选举的组织方式使得其结果总是被党严格控制的。党的全国代表大会主要有两个目的。第一，它是党的高级领导层宣布新的方针以及调整共产党意识形态的主要场所，比如江泽民的“三个代表”理论和胡锦涛的“科学发展观”。第二，代表们“选举”出新的中央委员会——这个委员会的成员其实事先已经被高层选定了。

中共中央委员会是党的核心领导阶层，由掌握着实权的300名左右的“决策者”组成。他们包括党的高级官员、大多数（但不是全部）国务院各部部长、主要机构负责人、军方最高级将领、一些省的省长和省委书记、少数最有权力的国有企业负责人。他们是中国的“枢机主教团（译者注：负责教皇的选举）”，他们负责任命由24人组成的中央政治局，然后再从其中选出5至9人组成政治局常务委员会，真正掌管着中共。在两届全国党代表大会之间，这个中央委员会以“全体会议”的形式批准重大决策以及领导人的变动。虽然这些决策往往是由最高层下达的，但中央委员会成员的确掌握着一定实权和影响力，在幕后的政治斗争可能异常激烈，并且对最后的结果会产生一些影响。

这个政治局常务委员会的九人成员（他们总是男性）实际上有着次序排位，从1号到9号。无论他们是否担任正式的公职，他们是在中国的政治制度里作出重要决定的真正的“大哥大”。例如，排名第5的李长春，除了是一个低级职位的全国人大成员以外，没有掌管任何政府部门。但实际上，他是党的宣传部门的首要负责人，负责所有媒体和网络审查。《福布斯》杂志称他为“控制着13亿中国人的所见、所闻、所说” 的人。排名第9的周永康也“只”是一名全国人大成员，但是实际上控制着中国国内的安全力量。

政治局及常委会的1号人物是中共中央总书记。胡锦涛在2002年11月的16大上被任命担任这个职务，并在2007年10月的17大获得连任。实际上，这使他成为了中国最有权势的人。胡锦涛是党的首席负责人，并且控制着军队和政府，我们即将看到，他也有让他能够更加直接的控制这两部分的兼任职务。

据推测，胡锦涛将在2012年秋季的下届全国党代会中辞去总书记职务，以符合限制最高领导人连续担任两个五年任期的新的“传统”。那时，有希望接替他的职位的人是习近平。目前在党内，习近平在政治局常委会中的排名是第6位（仅仅比李长春低一位）。在过去的五年时间里，他掌管着党的最高行政机构——书记处。那里包括非常关键的党的中央组织部。中组部控制党内所有的人事安排（因此也包括军队和政府的高级官员）。与此同时，习近平也是中央党校（等同于肯尼迪学院【译者注：哈佛大学公共政策研究院】）的校长，中国高级党政官员在这里接受培训。胡锦涛在被任命为党的最高领导人之前，也担任着这两个职位。而这并非巧合。这两个职位给予了习近平强大的权力基础，使他可以在各个关键职位安插他的支持者并且巩固他作为“继承人”的地位。

中国现任总理温家宝，在政治局常委会中排名第3。无论是谁接替总理——被看好的候选人是现在排名第7位（比习近平稍低）的李克强——几乎肯定会在2012秋季公布的新排名中向上移动。

自1990年代末起，所有政治局成员都受到一个半官方的法定退休年龄（68岁）的限制。如果该规则适用于2012年（目前没有理由预计它不会），则现任常委中除了习近平和李克强之外，另外的7名成员全部都会退休（包括胡锦涛和温家宝），并被新人取代。在最有可能获得提拔并接替他们的16名“下级”政治局成员中，只有9人足够年轻。这大大缩短了有可能填补七个空位的竞争者名单。这份名单包括了诸如王岐山和薄熙来这样的名字，这些人我后面会更详细的谈到。

我也会详细的谈到胡，温，习，李的个人性格和政治倾向，以及这些权力交接有可能会带来的变化。但首先我们要看看中国另外两个的权力结构：军队和政府，以及它们是如何融入整个政治权力系统的。



军

中国人民解放军（PLA）作为共产党的军事武装力量建立于1927年（当时共产党刚刚成立六年），比中华人民共和国于1949年成立早二十多年。因此，这支军队的成立实际上早于政府，它主要效忠于党。中共统治中国的一个基本原则就是毛泽东定下的 “党指挥枪”。

中国的国防部不能行使对中国人民解放军的控制（顺便说一下，解放军不仅包括中国的陆军，还包括它的海军，空军和导弹部队（二炮））。作为中国政府一部分的国防部，仅负责解放军和外国军队间的联系事务。中国军事力量的指挥权和控制权是由党的中央军事委员会（CMC）行使的。这个由11人组成的高度保密的机构，理论上由党的中央委员会选出，但实际上是被政治局常委会严密控制的。（外人常感到困惑的是，政府机构中也有一个中央军事委员会，两者有着一模一样的成员。但是党的中央军委是拥有实权的那一个）

党的中央军委直接控制着高级军事官员的人事任命、军事单位的部署、武器装备的支出。除了解放军，它也与公安部共同指挥人民武装警察（PAP）——这是中国主要的国内安全力量。

中央军委的11位成员大部分是指挥解放军各大总部的高级军事将领，类似于美国的参谋长联席会议。尽管国防部只发挥着有限的作用，但作为高级将领和党员的现任国防部长梁光烈将军，也是中央军事委员会的一名成员。不用说，所有其他中央军委的将军们同时也都是党员。通过他们的总政治部（其负责人李继耐将军也是中央军委成员），解放军保持着一个由政委组成的网络，他们和军事指挥官一起工作，保证每一个军事单位都对党效忠。

自2004年9月以来，胡锦涛一直担任军委主席，中国的三军最高指挥官。从某种意义上说，这是他担任党的总书记之后的必然结果。然而值得注意的是，他的前任江泽民从总书记的位置退下来之后，还担任中央军委主席长达两年之久。一些西方观察家怀疑江泽民有意模仿邓小平。在整个80年代，邓用自己作为中央军委主席的职位在幕后担任“中国最高领导人”，即使在他辞去了更加正式的职务很久以后依然如此。当时有传言说，胡锦涛和江泽民之间有着激烈的摩擦。只是在江泽民于2004年彻底退休后，这样的传言才消失殆尽。

这也是为什么当2008年的中共中央委员会全体会议没有像外界广泛预测的那样任命习近平（胡锦涛的公认继任者）为三名中央军委副主席之一的时候，观察者们恍然大悟似地发问：胡锦涛是否想学习江泽民，并且计划在他任期结束后通过中央军委继续掌握权力？他是否试图另选一个人——比如他的亲信李克强——作为他的继任者？这样的猜测让中国观察家兴奋了一段时间，但当习近平一年后被毫无争议地任命为中央军委副主席以后，这些推测渐渐销声匿迹。这个去年十月做出的决定，让习近平成为中央军委中除了胡锦涛之外的唯一文职人员，并且表明了他走上了全面继承胡锦涛所有权力（不是部分权力）的轨道，即将成为中国“最高领导人”。

最后还有一点值得一提。在过去，政治局中的很多委员都是解放军将军。这在很大程度上是因为他们是革命战争时期的一代人。即便是邓小平也曾是一名解放军高级政委，在退役前参加过革命战争时期的一些最为重要的战役。而现在的24名政治局委员中只有两位是解放军的将军。九常委中没有一个人曾经在军队中担任过重要职务（当胡锦涛初次进入中央军委的时候，其官方个人简历中提到他曾经在军队担任过政委等各种职务，但之前没有人知道这一点；相同的事情最近在习近平身上也发生了。这很可能只是为他们的简历装点门面的象征性职位而已。）

虽然有一部分中共高级领导人是解放军高级将领的子女，但是解放军在党的领导集体中的直接缺失在观察家们当中引起一些疑问。他们怀疑最近几代中国领导人和军方的关系有多好和多深。一些解放军将领对胡锦涛的温和对台政策产生的挫折感将这一问题变得更加明显。一些人推测说，像胡锦涛这样的与军方的个人联系比较弱的领导人，通过对解放军更加慷慨地拨款和对军方自行其是更加宽容来作为补偿。然而这种论断仍然具备高度的猜测性质。



政府

最后，我们再来看看中国政府。

从理论上说，中国政府是围绕着全国人民代表大会（NPC)构建的。人大在每年的三月定期召开。事实上，这个由3000名左右的代表组成的机构——其中大约三分之二是共产党员——只能批准已经由党和党的中央政治局做出的政策和人事变动。在几乎与全国人民代表大会召开的同时，中国还会举办一年一度的中国人民政治协商会议（CPPCC），这是一个由各行各业的杰出人士组成的顾问性会议，他们中的很多人并不是党员。这两个会议被合称为“两会”。近年来，由于大众媒体影响力的增长，尽管“两会”没有任何实际权力，它仍然成为一个关于讨论公众关注的问题和塑造公共意见的引人注目的平台。从这个意义上来讲，他们与现代美国总统竞选中的党派全国大会有很多相似之处：沟通，但是不做实际的决定。

每隔五年，全国党代会结束后，全国人代会立即地（当然不是巧合地）“选举”出一名总统（在中国，这实际上叫主席），他主要是在礼仪上作为中国国家元首。自从1993年，江泽民成为国家主席以后，这项工作的唯一候选人一直是中共的总书记。所以胡锦涛在2002年10月出任党的一号人物后不久，他就在2003年3月被“选举”为国家主席。国家主席任期也被限制为两个连续的五年。人们普遍预测，习近平在2012秋季接任胡锦涛的党总书记职位之后，他会在2013年3月被全国人大“选举”为国家主席。习近平现在担任国家副主席一职。

国务院经由国家主席任命，全国人大官方“批准”成立——从本质上讲，这是中国的各部部长组成的内阁——包括该内阁负责人，国务院总理，他有几位副总理协助工作。毫无疑问，既然国家主席也是党的总书记，他是事实上决定谁来担任这个职务的人。

国务院以及组成它的各个部门是中国中央政府的代名词。总理是政府首脑，等效于首相。本质上来讲，中央政府的作用就是把党的各项政治指示和优先事项纳入具体的国家政策和法规，并管理它们。因此总理需要对执行各项政策负责，比如稳定的经济增长，环境保护，实施独生子女政策。实际上，总理是个总管，由各种半官方的智囊团协助工作。许多中国的最重要的官僚机构，如国家发展和改革委员会（NDRC，发改委，中国的经济规划机构），中国人民银行（PBOC，该国的中央银行），国有资产监督管理委员会（SASAC，拥有中国最大的国有企业）和国家统计局（NBS），都直接向国务院报告。

自国务院往下，中央政府有一个国家公务员制度。总理被认为是一级公务员，副总理是二级，部长是三级，如此依次往下。然而，对包括国务院本身在内的所有级别的官员来说，他们都在党委的阴影笼罩之下，党委提供“指导意见”并且决定关键的人事变动。不出所料的是，总理也恰巧是国务院党委的书记。这是个对应着政治局常委中的3号人物的关键职位，这也是他真正的权力源泉。（党委系统也有助于解释为什么党的领导人可以这么确信所有合适的人都会被任命到合适的职位。政治局常委会2号人物吴邦国，是全国人大代表大会的党委负责人。这样一来，他可以确定党的1号人物能够当选国家主席，以及他关于政府职位的任命能够获得批准。——他只需简单地对他下属的全国人大代表发布党内指令就行了）

现任国家总理温家宝是在2003年3月被胡锦涛任命的，这是他于2002年10月获任国务院党委书记职务并在政治局常委排名第3的地位带来的。因此，实际上他的政府职务晋升是由于在此之前几个月的党内职务晋升决定的。和国家主席一样，国家总理的任期也被限制在两个五年任期之内。普遍预测的是，当习近平在2013年3月接任国家主席的时候，他会任命李克强成为总理。李克强自2008年的上一次任命以来，担任排名第一位的副总理，负责经济事务。并非巧合的是他同时担任着国务院党委2号人物（副书记）。当然，我们可以通过观察在2012年10月李克强是否被提升到温家宝的党内位置，来提前获知他是否能够在2013年接任国务院总理。



在对中国政治体系的三方结构——党，政，军——以及各个部分的权力分配做了一个概述之后，现在我们可以对即将到来的权力交接有一个更加清晰的概念。

如果一切如预期那样，习近平将通过一系列程序和步骤，顺利地在党政军三方面接替胡锦涛担任最高领导人：在2012年10月召开的第18届党的全国代表大会上，习近平会成为中共中央总书记，也是政治局常委1号人物。与此同时，他也可能由中央军委副主席的职位被提升为中央军委主席，这个职位让他成为中国三军最高领导人。随后，在2013年3月举行的全国人民代表大会中，他将“当选”国家主席，成为中国的国家元首。那时他将任命总理和各部部长。

等到2012年10月党的全国代表大会结束时，我们就将知道习近平会在来年3月任命谁成为总理，因为这个人（几乎确定是李克强）会被提升并接替温家宝成为国务院党委书记和政治局常委的3号人物。值得一提的是中国的现任总理并没有任何中央军委的职务。他拥有党和政府领导人的关键地位，而不是军队。

除了习近平和李克强，9名政治局常委中剩下的职位预计会大换血，由新的年轻一代接任。而填补这七名重要职位的主要候选者是16名“下级”政治局委员中的9名年轻成员，他们足够年轻因此到时不用退休，当然也有其他的竞争者在伺机而动。党内很有可能已经做出了这些决定，只是等待向民众公开。但是就像我们即将看到的那样，一些政治斗争仍然有可能发生。



习近平会替代胡温？

到目前为止，我主要侧重中国权力交接的体系制度方面。这一点很重要，因为自从邓小平在1990年代中期将权力交接给江泽民以后，中国的权力交接变得更加制度化，当然这是和随性独裁的毛泽东时代相比。但是此事的另一个侧面是这些领导人的个人性格和政治倾向。这依然让外界很感兴趣，因为这将有助于评估中国领导人的交接对未来意味着什么。

然而因为如下几个原因，如果想要着手探究这方面的情况会是非常困难的。第一，党对其领导人的私人生活有着严密的保护措施。由中共发布的官方个人简历泛泛地将他们描述成毫无特点的工作人员和尽职尽责的工作狂。除了谣言以外，公众对他们的家庭生活、政治与职业声誉、以及关键性的人生经历知之甚少。第二，他们与他们的政治竞争对手之间的关于政策的争论也几乎是闭门进行的，而且从来不会公之于众。我们只能凭借他们的公开或私人的谈话来推测他们的政治路线，中国对外展示的是坚强的、有纪律的、完全相同的立场。第三，任何可能获得提升的中共党员——尤其是高层提升——都被建议不要亮出自己手上的牌。如果习近平和李克强怀有任何激进的想法或者对路线方向的改变，也不会告诉我们。

把这些丑话说完，我再来大致勾勒一下即将在中国的权力交接中成为主要角色的那些人。



胡锦涛，年龄68岁。像他们这一代的很多领导人以及他们的前任一样，他被训练成为一名土木工程师。他的主要权力基于共青团，这源于他在1984-1985年间担任共青团中央书记处第一书记。他在中共内部仕途一路升迁，获得了诚实、服从、守口如瓶、以及很少在公众面前表达自己意见的声誉，他倾向于在幕后悄悄地建立联盟。有些人可能因为他缺乏个人色彩和魅力而诟病他；在发表公共演讲的时候，他必定会显得过于正式和僵硬。胡锦涛被邓小平指定为江泽民的继任者，江泽民只能无奈的接受这一结果。胡花费自己的第一个五年任期来把江的亲信从关键岗位上换下来，并换上自己的亲信（不过，至少有三名政治局常委——吴邦国（2号人物），贾庆林（4号人物）和李长春（5号人物）被普遍认为是忠于江泽民的。这种情况对胡锦涛想要树立自己的控制力制造了一些麻烦）。自从胡锦涛接任了最高领导人的职位，他的核心主题一直是转变经济发展重心，从惊人的经济增长率到不同阶层不同地区间更加平均的利益分配（这在最近被称为“包容性增长”的方法），以避免社会和政治动荡（确保“和谐社会”）。本月初全国人大批准的的“五年计划”中优先提及了这些事项。



温家宝，年龄也是68岁，是一名地质学家，并在担任这一领域的副部长的时候被时任中共总书记的胡耀邦看重。温家宝的能力和对细节的掌握让他获得了上级的支持，包括胡耀邦和朱�基。然而接任总理以来为他赢得声誉的是他的“平易近人”。和胡锦涛以及很多中国官员不一样的是，温家宝在和民众交流的时候看起来更加轻松自然，这一事实让他很受欢迎，就像他的昵称“温爷爷”一样。温家宝的人气偶尔引起了与他的同事们之间的摩擦——尤其是在四川大地震的救援工作中，当时他在屏幕上的救援努力和手里拿着扩音器的形象，抢过了胡锦涛主席的风头——但他们也敏锐地意识到了这一点的用处。温家宝的妻子是一个非常精明的商人，据报道她通过钻石生意获得了财富，她从不公开露面，因为担心这会损害温家宝受欢迎的程度，这也是被认为是禁忌的话题。

尽管表面上是中国最高决策者，温家宝对政策的影响力还不是那么清晰。他关于经济事务上的哲学是很模糊的。在一些场合，他似乎通过提及中国经济的“严重失衡”来呼吁市场化改革；在另外一些场合，他则称赞中国“市场化社会主义”的国有体系让政府能够直接控制经济。过去的一年里，在很多不同的场合，温家宝都发表了“中国需要深化政治改革”的发言，这也引起了很多评论和推测。一些人甚至推测党内出现了内部裂缝：温家宝领导着一个民主改革派来对抗由吴邦国和周永康领导的强硬派（这种理论的势头在今年的全国人大会议中得到升温，吴邦国在全国人大会议上的发言抵触了温家宝的观点）。不过，温家宝从来没有清晰的说明他所谓的“政治改革”的实际意义，而且温家宝和其他人的实际立场差别可能远比外界猜想的要小的多。

不管怎么说，胡温都只剩下的一年多的任期，因此他们都不大有可能对党的未来走向发挥更长久的影响力。



习近平被预计将替代胡锦涛成为中国最高领导人。他今年57岁，是一位所谓的“太子党”，中国高级领导人的后代。他的父亲习仲勋，曾经参与领导了共产主义革命并在1960年代早期担任国务院副总理，这之后在毛泽东的文化大革命中遭到了清洗。被邓小平平反以后，习仲勋担任广东省省委书记，在深圳他计划并实施了中国第一个“经济特区”并且是一位积极提倡市场改革的官员。他曾经告诉邓小平说“我们需要改革中国并且建立这一经济特区，即便这意味着我们要向前开拓一条血腥的道路，我也会为此负责。”习仲勋后来公开谴责了在1989年在天安门广场发生的暴力镇压。

他父亲的遗产似乎让习近平坚定地站在政治经济改革这一阵营。然而，一些人认为习近平在文革期间曾表现得“比红更红”，以一个坚定的党的忠诚战士面目度过了难关。（新加坡总理李光耀曾这样形容习近平：“一个深思熟虑的经过很多磨难的人”，甚至把他和纳尔逊・曼德拉相提并论）。像胡锦涛一样，习近平也是清华毕业的工程师。通过在党内稳步的上升——包括在沿海关键且繁华的省份福建、上海、浙江任职——他学会了不亮出自己手中的牌。总的来说，他没有什么丑闻或者争议，专注在中共批准的与腐败斗争的战役上面。因此，习近平的内心想法，以及在接任执政之后会是什么样，基本仍然是一个谜，至少对于外人来说是这样。

习近平娶了中国的著名歌唱家彭丽媛，因此她成为不寻常的公开露面的第一夫人。他们的女儿目前化名在哈佛大学就读。



李克强，55岁，预计将会接替温家宝成为总理。这是中国的最高决策者以及排在习近平后的2号人物。和习近平相比，他来自一个卑微得多的家庭——他的父亲曾经在贫穷的农村省份安徽担任地方官员——但是他在北京大学获得了法律学位并且获得了经济学博士学位。在提升至共青团（胡锦涛的主要权力来源）的领导职位的过程中，他成为胡锦涛的关键亲信。在1998年，李克强成为中国有史以来最年轻的省级官员，执掌人口众多的农业省份河南。

他在那里的任期内受到一些负面事件的影响，其中包括由于被污染的血液被粗心地使用而导致艾滋病传播的可怕丑闻，这给他带来了“坏运气”的名声。但是他成功地提升河南经济——也因为他是胡的亲信——让他晋升为辽宁省省委书记，在那里他倡导振兴全省夕阳工业区的雄心勃勃的经济计划。

有一种普遍的看法，认为李克强是胡锦涛挑选的接班人，但他在随后的权力斗争中败给了习近平。即使李已经成为副总理，温家宝的预订继承人，仍然有很多传言：王岐山和薄熙来希望打败他而让自己成为总理。批评家提及李克强过去在河南的问题以及他“坏运气”的不好名声。然而，在一系列成功的外事访问中，李克强表现的很好，这似乎稳固了他的地位以及清除了在成为中国下一届总理的路上的障碍。



王岐山现在是政治局委员（但不是常委委员）并担任国务院负责经济和金融事务的副总理。王岐山在大学里面学的是历史。和李克强相比，他拥有“能干”的名声。在1990年代，作为中国建设银行的行长和国家央行（中国人民银行）的副行长，他改组了中国的银行，以应对风险巨大的不良债务危机。当北京市市长在2003年搞砸了SARS应对工作之后，王岐山被任命来替代北京市市长并收拾残局。他还领导北京在2008年举办了非常成功的奥运会。王岐山目前作为国家主席胡锦涛的特使参加“中美经济与战略对话”，在这里他获得了来自国外同行——如美国前财政部长鲍尔森——的赞誉，他认为王“果断并且好奇”，而且颇有“冷幽默”。鉴于王的辉煌纪录，毫无疑问很多人认为他——其中很多人也相信王岐山自己也是这么认为的——是一个强大的总理候选人，即使是在李克强被指定为总理继承人之后。然而王也有一个不利因素——他的年龄：现在已经62岁。在他的法定退休年龄之前，王只能获得一届任期。尽管他几乎不可能获得2号人物的位置，但王岐山在接下来几年仍然很有可能成为这个9人团体中非常有影响力的一员。



薄熙来在即将到来的权力交接中以持“外卡”的面目出现。和习近平一样，薄熙来——现任重庆党委书记——也是一位“太子党”，但是薄熙来被认为是“太子党中的太子”。他的父亲薄一波是一名长征老兵，后来他反对毛泽东在“大跃进”中的做法；在文化大革命之中，薄一波受到折磨而他的妻子（薄熙来的母亲）被殴打致死。薄一波在文革之后是“中共八老”的成员之一，这些最高级的解放军将军在背后为邓小平提供支持。与习近平的父亲形成鲜明对比的是，薄熙来的父亲在1989年实行的戒严镇压行动中，是一名关键强硬派。

薄熙来长相英俊，口齿伶俐，熟悉媒体。他有时候会被喻为中国的肯尼迪。在1990年代，作为大连市市长，薄熙来通过极大复兴了这个当时日渐没落的港口城市而明显加分。2003年薄熙来——他毕业于北京大学历史系，并且娶了一个著名的律师——接任商务部。在担任商务部长期间他令他的外国同行们眼花缭乱。虽然薄熙来——现年61岁，并且是政治局成员——有一个令人印象深刻的高调的职业生涯，他一直未能进入核心权力圈。有一部分可能的原因是出于对他个人魅力以及他愿意讨好媒体和公众的怨恨。西方媒体对他的赞扬肯定没有为他在中国保守的权力掌握者之中赢得任何朋友。

当薄熙来2007年被任命到一个有3100万人口的城市化省份重庆做党委书记的时候，这被视为他“成败在此一举”的关键时刻。毋庸置疑的是，他成功地引起了全国人的瞩目，无论是他对这个城市的黑帮所做的打击（其中一些辩护律师因为他们的职业行为被关进监狱），还是他野心勃勃（同时也很昂贵）的大规模经济适用房的建设计划，薄熙来一直在制造新闻。他还用一场民粹主义似的旨在恢复文革的精神（如果不是文革的混乱的话）的运动让西方世界感到困惑。这场运动包括称赞毛主席的“红色歌曲”和“红色短信”——考虑到他们家在文革中的悲惨历史，这是一个十分奇怪，甚至有些讽刺性的举动。没有人确切地知道这些能够给他增加什么筹码，或者薄熙来会这样做多久，但是肯定不会有人忽略他。去年12月，习近平到重庆访问期间，公开赞扬了薄熙来的新毛泽东主义运动。

薄熙来近来的举动以及滑稽表演有可能让他得到一个9人政治局常委的名额——也许这只是为了安抚这个捉摸不定的政客（就像我们在军队里说的那样，“站在帐篷里往外撒尿好过站在帐篷外往里撒尿）。如果当真如此——当然这样的结论还远远没有得到肯定——他会是接下来几年里最有趣最值得观察的一个人。



很明显的是，即使我们只关注有可能接任“九常委”的候选人，在即将到来的权力交接之中也会涉及到很多人士。但是为了简单起见，最好的方法是把关注的重点放在以上六个人身上。我只想再作一个更进一步、更广泛一点的观察预测。2012到2013的权力移交体现了“第四代”到“第五代”领导核心的过渡。第一二代分别在毛泽东和邓小平的领导下，占主导地位的是在共产主义革命中奋战的将军和干部们。接下来由江泽民和胡锦涛领导的两代，占主导地位的是工程师，他们在苏式中央计划经济体制中获得晋升，也很适应使中国“现代化”的市场改革路线。现任9名常委中，有7名工程师，1位（温家宝）地质学家，只有一位（李克强）是律师/经济学家。然而而下一任国家主席，习近平，是一个工程师，大多数未来在他领导下的第五代领导人是学法律，经济，历史出身的。这些学科背景可以在中国面临挑战的时候提供不同的观点。

几乎所有的新一代领导人，都是在中国完成的学业，这一点和他们的子女不同（以习近平的女儿读哈佛大学，薄熙来的儿子读牛津大学为代表）。这些人在国外学习甚至在国外工作或者教书。我被一些清华的学生告知，出国读书——在挣钱角度来看很有价值——仍然被那些希望在党内提升的人视为职业死路。观察新一代“太子党”带着西方的文凭回到中国之后，这条规律是否会继续生效，而他们又会为中国政治带来什么新的观点，将会是很有趣的事情。

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Over the past few months, several people have written asking me to offer a short “primer” on China’s upcoming leadership transition, which begins next year. The handover to a new president and premier has generated plenty of speculation in the press, about who the leaders are and what is will all mean, but sometimes it’s useful to go back and fill in the very basics, since China has a unique and in some ways quite confusing political system.

The first and most important thing to understand about that political system is that it is composed of three parts. In the U.S., we have the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. In China there is the Party, the Army, and the State. Unlike in the U.S., where the three branches are co-equal and are specifically designed to check and balance each other’s powers, in China the Party is supreme and rules over the other two elements. China’s “leadership transition” involves coordinated handovers of power involving all three parts of the political system.

The Party

By “the Party,” I’m of course referring to the Communist Party of China (CPC, also known as the Chinese Communist Party or CCP), the political organization founded in 1921 which, under Mao Zedong, fought a revolutionary war that ultimately brought it to power in 1949. It is a Leninist party, which means that unlike most Western political parties, it is a tightly-organized, hierarchical organization similar to a military unit or religious order. In the United States, there is no such thing as being a “member” of the Republican or Democratic Party — the closest thing would be to register to vote in either party’s primary. Republican or Democratic “committees,” on either the local or national level, are really just funding and support co-ops for helping candidates; they are in no position to issue orders to voters, activists, candidates, or elected officials. Joining the Communist Party of China, in contrast, is a formal and highly selective process that takes several years to complete. Once initiated, a member must obey Party directives and take on whatever task (including official positions) the Party assigns. If they misbehave, or even break a law, they will be detained, investigated, and punished by the Party, not the police — only after being expelled from the Party will they be turned over to the country’s regular legal system for prosecution.

The best way to think of the Party is to imagine the human resources department of a huge multinational corporation — except that in this case, this HR department is so powerful it gets to appoint everyone from the Board and the CEO to the lowliest janitor, so it effectively calls the shots. In China, every government ministry, every military unit, every state-owned company – and in many cases private companies as well – has a Party committee that decides all major personnel issues and, in doing so, essentially acts as the power behind the throne. Now sometimes the boss of the more visible entity is also head of the Party unit, which means the formal boss actually does call the shots. But if the two roles are split — as they are, for instance, in every province — you can bet that the Party chief is the one holding most of the real power.

The Party’s 78 million members (a little over 5% of China’s total population) are essentially a pool of pre-screened candidates who can be slotted into whatever official role the Party leadership decides — with the understanding, of course, that their primary loyalty remains to the Party that put them there. Directives from Party superiors — on who to assign or promote, or what policies to pursue– are ultimately far more important than instructions received from more formal channels like ministries, courts, or corporate boards.

Every five years, the Party holds a National Congress, which since 1969 always takes place in the Great Hall of the People on Tiananmen Square. The last Congress, the 17th, was held in October 2007. In theory, the 2,000 or so delegates are elected by the grassroots Party membership; in reality, the elections are organized in such a way as to ensure a highly controlled outcome. The National Party Congress serves two main purposes. First, it is the main venue where senior Party leaders announce major new directions or adjustments in Party ideology, such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” theory or Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Development Concept.” Second, its delegates ”elect” the Party’s Central Committee, whose members have already been pre-selected from on high.

The Central Committee is the Party’s core leadership, the top 300 or so ”movers and shakers” who wield real power. They include the top officials in the Party itself, most (but not all) government ministers and major agency heads, the most senior military generals, several provincial governors and Party chiefs, and the CEOs from a handful of the most powerful state-owned enterprises. They are China’s “College of Cardinals” who appoint the 24-man Politburo, which is then narrowed even further into a 5 to 9-man Politburo Standing Committee that really runs the Party. During the five-year period between National Party Congresses, the Central Committee also meets in “plenary sessions” in order to ratify important policy or leadership changes. Although these decisions are often dictated from the top down, Central Committee members do hold real power and influence, and the behind-the-scenes political jockeying can be intense and plays at least some role in shaping the outcomes.

The nine men (and they have always all been men) on the Politburo Standing Committee are actually ranked in order of primacy, from #1 to #9. Regardless of what other formal offices they do or do not hold, they are the real ”top dogs” who make the important decisions in China’s political system. For instance, Li Changchun, ranked #5, currently holds no government post besides a rather lowly position as a mere member of the National People’s Congress. In fact, he is the Party’s propaganda chief, in charge of all media and internet censorship, who as Forbes puts it, “controls what 1.3 billion Chinese see, hear, and speak.” Zhou Yongkang, ranked #9, is also “just” an NPC member, but in reality controls China’s internal security forces.

The #1 spot on the Politburo and its Standing Committee belongs to the General Secretary of the Central Committee. Hu Jintao was appointed to this position at 16th National Party Congress in November 2002, and was reappointed at the 17th Congress in October 2007. This, in effect, makes him the most powerful man in China. Hu is the head of the Party, which controls the Army and the State, although as we shall see, he also has concurrent positions that give him more direct control of both.

It is presumed that Hu will step down as General Secretary at the next National Party Congress in the Fall of 2012, in keeping with a new “tradition” limiting the top ruler to two consecutive five-year terms. The man who is expected to replace him, at that time, is Xi Jinping. Within the Party, Xi currently serves as the 6th-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee (just below Li Changchun). For the last five years, he has run the Party’s Secretariate, the Party’s top administrative bureaucracy that includes the crucial Central Organization Department which controls all personnel assignments within the Party (and therefore the senior levels of both the Army and the State). At that same time, Xi was also appointed as Principal of the Central Party School, China’s equivalent of the Kennedy School where senior Party officials receive training. It’s no coincidence that Hu Jintao held the same two positions in the years leading up to his own appointment to the top Party post. Both positions give Xi Jinping a strong power base he can use to place his supporters in key positions and cement his claim as heir-apparent.

China’s current Premier, Wen Jiabao, also ranks #3 in the Party leadership on the Politburo Standing Committee. Whoever is tapped to replace him as Premier — the expected candidate is Li Keqiang, now ranked #7 (right below Xi) on the Standing Committee – would almost certainly move up when the new ranking is announced in Fall 2012.

Since the late 1990s, a semi-official mandatory retirement age of 68 has applied to all Politburo members. If that rule is applied in 2012 (and there is no reason to expect that it won’t), all seven members of the current Politburo Standing Committee besides Xi and Li (including Hu and Wen) will retire, and be replaced by new appointees. Of the 16 “junior” Politburo members most likely to move up and replace them, only nine will be young enough to stay on — significantly narrowing the list of likely contenders to fill the seven top slots that will open. That list that includes names like Wang Qishan and Bo Xilai, who I’ll have more to say about later.

I’ll also talk more about the personalities and politics of Hu, Wen, Xi, and Li, and what kind of changes the transition may bring. But first we need to look at the other two elements of China’s power structure, the Army and the State, and how they fit into the story.

The Army

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was founded in 1927 as the military arm of the Communist Party (which itself was founded only six years earlier). That’s more than two decades before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. So the Army actually came into existence before the State, and owes its primary loyalty to the Party. One of the bedrock principles of Communist rule in China was laid down by Mao when he said “the Party controls the gun.”

China’s Ministry of National Defense does not exercise command control over the PLA (which includes, by the way, not only China’s army, but also its navy, air force, and missile forces). The Ministry, which is part of the State, only serves as a liaison between the PLA and foreign militaries. Command and control of China’s military is exercised by the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), an highly secretive 11-man body theoretically elected by the Party’s Central Committee but in fact closely controlled by the Politburo Standing Committee. (To add some confusion, there is also a State entity called the Central Military Commission comprised of the exact same members, but the Party CMC is the one that holds and exercises the real power).

The Party CMC directly controls the appointment of senior military officers, the deployment of units, and spending on arms and equipment. In addition to the PLA, it also shares command of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), China’s main internal security force, with the (State) Ministry of Public Security.

Most of the 11-member CMC is composed of top generals commanding large components of the PLA, much like the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite the limited role of the Ministry of National Defense, the current Minister, General Liang Guanglie, is a member of the CMC, in his capacity as a senior general and Party member. Needless to say, all the other generals serving on the CMC are also Party members. Through its General Political Department (whose director, General Li Jinai is also a CMC member), the PLA maintains a network of political commissars whose job is to ensure the Party loyalty of each and every military unit, working alongside unit military commanders.

Since September 2004, Hu Jintao has served as Chairman of the CMC, the commander-in-chief of China’s military. In a sense, it is the natural corollary to his role as General Secretary of the Party. However, it’s worth noting that his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, hung to the post of CMC Chairman for nearly two years after he stepped down as General Secretary. Some Western observers suspected that Jiang intended to imitate Deng Xiaoping, who used his position as CMC Chairman to wield power from behind the scenes as China’s “paramount leader” throughout the 1980s, long after he had stepped down from his more formal roles. There was talk of serious friction between Hu and Jiang, which was only defused when Jiang finally stepped aside in 2004.

That’s one of the reasons why observers did a double-take when the CPC Central Committee plenum in 2008 did not appoint Xi Jinping (Hu’s presumed successor) as one of three CMC Vice Chairmen, as it was widely expected to do. Was Hu trying to pull a Jiang, and planning to hold onto power through the CMC after his “term” as leader expired? Or was he trying to position a rival candidate — perhaps his protégé Li Keqiang — as his successor? Such speculation entertained China watchers for a while, but fizzled when Xi was appointed — apparently without any controversy — the very next year. The move, last October, makes Xi the only civilian on the CMC besides Hu, and suggests that he is on track to inherit all, not just some, of Hu’s powers as “paramount leader.”

One final observation is worth making. In the past, many members of the Party Politburo were PLA generals. That’s largely because they came from a generation that fought in the Revolution. Even Deng Xiaoping was a PLA veteran who served as a senior political commissar in some of the most important battles of the Revolution. Only two of the full 24-member Politburo are serving PLA generals. Not one of the nine members of the current Politburo Standing Committee ever performed signficant service in the military (When Hu was first appointed to the CMC, an official bio was released indicating that he had served in various military positions as a political commissar, which nobody had previously been aware of; the same thing happened, just recently, with Xi. It’s doubtful, however, whether these were ever anything more than nominal positions to bolster their resumes).

Although a handful of senior Party leaders are the children of top PLA generals, the eclipse of the PLA’s direct presence in higher Party leadership circles raises questions, among some observers, about how strong and deep of a connection more recent generations of Chinese leaders have with the military. The question is heightened by the evident frustration felt by at least some PLA generals at Hu Jintao’s more conciliatory policy towards Taiwan. Some speculate that leaders like Hu, who have weaker personal ties to the military, have compensated by granting the PLA more generous funding and a somewhat longer leash in pursuing its own agenda. This claim, however, remains highly speculative.

The State

Last and — oddly enough — least, we come to China’s government.

In theory, the Chinese State is constructed around the National People’s Congress (NPC) which meets every year in March. In truth, this 3,000 or so delegate body — of which roughly 2/3 are Communist Party members — simply ratifies both policy and personnel decisions already made by the Party and its Politburo. At nearly the same time the NPC takes place, Beijing also hosts the annual Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory gathering of prominent people from all walks of Chinese life, many of them non-Party members. Together, they are referred to as the “two meetings.” In recent years, due to the rising impact of mass media, the “two meetings,” despite their lack of any real power, have become a high-profile platform for airing issues of public concern and shaping public opinion. In this sense, they’ve come to serve much the same function as national political conventions now do as part of the modern U.S. presidential campaign: to communicate rather than actually decide.

Every five years, immediately (and not coincidentally) following each National Party Congress, the National People’s Congress “elects” a President (actually called zhuxi, or “chairman,” in Chinese) to the largely ceremonial role of China’s Head of State. Ever since 1993, when Jiang Zemin became President, the sole candidate for the job has always been the General Secretary of the Communist Party. So soon after Hu Jintao took over the #1 Party spot in October 2002, he was elected President at the next NPC meeting in March 2003. The President is limited to two consecutive five-year terms. The expectation is that after Xi Jinping succeeds Hu as Party chief in Fall 2012, he will subsequently be elected President by the next NPC in March 2013. In the meantime, Xi currently serves as Vice President.

The President appoints, and the NPC officially “confirms,” the State Council — essentially, China’s cabinet of ministers — including the head of that cabinet, the Premier, assisted by several Vice Premiers. Of course since the President is also the head of the Party, he really does get to select who gets these positions.

The State Council and its component ministries are synonymous with China’s Central Government. The Premier is the Head of Government, China’s equivalent of a Prime Minister. Essentially, the role of the Central Government is to turn the political directives and priorities of the Party into concrete policies and regulations, and to administer them. The Premier is therefore responsible for the execution of various policy goals such as stable economic growth, protecting the environment, and enforcing the one-child policy. In effect, the Premier is the wonk-in-chief, and is assisted in this role by a variety of quasi-official scholarly think-tanks that advise the State Council. Many of China’s most important bureaucratic agencies, such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, China’s central economic planning agency), the People’s Bank of China (PBOC, the country’s central bank), the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC, which owns China’s largest SOEs) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) report directly to the State Council.

From the State Council on down, the Central Government is staffed by a national civil service. The Premier himself is considered a Level 1 civil servant, the Vice Premiers are Level 2, ministers Level 3, and so on. However, for each unit or level of bureaucracy, including the State Council itself, there exists a shadow Party committee that provides “guidance” and determines all key personnel decisions. It should be no surprise, then, that the Premier also happens to be the Party Secretary of the State Council party committee. It is this key Party position that corresponds to the #3 slot on the Politburo Standing Committee, which is his real source of power.

(The shadow system of Party committees also helps explain why the Party leadership can be so certain all the right people will be appointed to office. The #2 man on the Politburo Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, is the head of the NPC’s Party committee. In that capacity, he can make sure the Party’s #1 man is elected President, and that all of his State Council appointments are approved, simply by issuing Party orders to the NPC delegates under his command).

The current Premier is Wen Jiabao, who was appointed by Hu Jintao in March 2003, subsequent to his installation as the head of the State Council Party committee and #3 spot on the Politburo Standing Committee in October 2002. In effect, his official promotion was merely a reflection of his Party promotion a few months earlier. Like the President, the Premier is limited to two consecutive five-year terms. Most people expect that when Xi Jinping is elected President in March 2013, he will appoint Li Keqiang Premier. Li has been serving as the first-ranked Vice Premier, in charge of economic matters, since the last round of appointments in March 2008. He is also, not coincidentally, the #2 man (deputy secretary) on the State Council Party committee. Of course, we will know in advance whether Li will take over as Premier in 2013, depending on whether he gets promoted to Wen’s Party positions in October 2012.

Now that we have an overview of the tripartite structure of China’s political system — Party, Army, State — and the positions of power in each, we can get a clearer idea of the leadership transition about to take place.

If everything goes as expected, Xi Jinping will, in a sequence of steps, succeed Hu Jintao in the top leadership position in the Party, the Army, and the State. In October 2012, when the 18th National Party Congress meets, Xi will become the Secretary General of the Communist Party and the #1 man on the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee. It is also likely that, at that time, he will also be promoted from Vice-Chairman to Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), making him the commander-in-chief of China’s military. Then in March 2013, when the National People’s Congress meets, he will be “elected” to the office of President, China’s Head of State, where he will proceed to appoint the Premier and all other ministers in the Central Government.

By the end of the National Party Congress in October 2012, we will already know who Xi will appoint as Premier that next March, because that person (most likely Li Keqiang) will have been promoted to replace Wen as Party Secretary of the State Council Party committee and #3 man on the Politburo Standing Committee. It is worth noting that China’s current Premier does not have any seat on the Central Military Commission. He holds a key position in the Party and State leaderships, but not the Army.

Other than Xi and Li, the rest of the 9-member Politburo Standing Committee is expected to see a complete turnover, with a new, younger generation taking over. The prime candidates to fill these seven top spots are the nine out of 16 “junior” Politburo members who will be young enough to avoid retirement, although it is entirely possible that other contenders are waiting in the wings. It’s quite likely that most of the decisions have already been made within the Party, and are only waiting to be made public. But as we shall see, some political jockeying may still be playing out.

Xi will replace Hu Wen?

So far, I’ve focused primarily on the institutional dynamics of China’s power transition. That’s important, because ever since Deng handed thing over to Jiang in the mid-90s, power has become far more institutionalized in China than it was, say, under the rather arbitrary, dictatorial rule of Mao. Nevertheless, the other side of the equation — the personalities and politics of the leaders themselves — remains of great interest, especially in evaluating what China’s leadership transition will mean for the future.

This aspect, however, can be quite frustrating to get a handle on, for several reasons. First, the Party remains quite protective of the private lives of its leaders. The official biographies released by the Party generally portray them as faceless functionaries and dutiful workaholics. We are told next to nothing about their family life, political or professional reputation, or formative life experiences, except by rumor. Second, contests over policy or among political rivals in the Party take place almost entirely behind closed doors, and are never revealed to the public. We can only guess, from public hints and private conversations, where the fault lines might be; to the ouside world, the Party presents a solid, disciplined, utterly homogenous front. Third, any Party member who is in line for promotion — particularly a top promotion — is well advised to keep his cards close to his vest. If Xi or Li are harboring any radical ideas or planning any bold changes in direction, they’re not gong to tell us about it.

Keeping all of these caveats in mind, I’ll briefly try to outline what we do know about the main figures who can be expected to loom large in China’s upcoming leadership transition:

Hu Jintao, age 68, was trained, like many leaders of his generation and the one that preceded him, as a civil engineer. His main power base is the Communist Youth League (CYL), which he led as First Secretary in 1984-85. As he rose up the Party ladder, he gained a reputation for being honest, obedient, and tight-lipped, rarely offering his own views in public, prefering to quietly build coalitions behind the scenes. Some might fault him for lacking personal color and charisma; he certainly can seem uncomfortably formal and stiff when speaking in public. Hu was tapped as Jiang’s successor by Deng Xiaoping, and was only reluctantly accepted by Jiang. As a result, he spent most of his first five-year term unseating Jiang’s proteges from key positions and replacing them with his own (nevertheless, at least three members of the current Politburo Standing Committee — Wu Bangguo (#2), Jia Qinlin (#4), and Li Changchun (#5), the top men besides Wen — were originally considered Jiang loyalists, which gives some idea of the difficulty Hu had in asserting control). Ever since taking over the top position, Hu’s central theme has been to shift the emphasis of economic development away from breakneck growth towards a more even distribution of benefits among regions and social classes (an approach recently dubbed “inclusive growth”), in order to head off social and political unrest (ensure a “harmonious society”). The latest Five Year Plan, ratified by the NPC earlier this month, was the very first to fully reflect these priorities.

Wen Jiabao, also age 68, is a geologist by background, and was serving as Vice Minister in this field when he caught the eye of then-General Secretary Hu Yaobang in the 1980s. Wen’s competence and mastery of detail won him the support of powerful mentors, including HYB and Premier Zhu Rongji. But it’s been his “common touch” that has defined Wen’s reputation since taking over as Premier. Unlike Hu Jintao, and many other Chinese officials for that matter, Wen seems genuinely at ease when talking with everyday citizens, a fact that has earned him great popularity, as well as the nickname “Grandpa Wen.” Occasionally Wen’s popularity seems to have rubbed his colleagues the wrong way — particularly in the aftermath of the Sichuan Earthquake, when his on-the-scene relief efforts, bullhorn in hand, left President Hu feeling upstaged — but they are also keenly aware of its usefulness. [Wen's wife is a very savvy businesswoman who reportedly has made a fortune in the diamond trade. She never appears with him in public, and the topic is considered taboo, for fear it would damage Wen's populist credentials].

Wen’s influence over policy is less clear, despite his ostensible role as China’s top policymaker. On economic matters, his philosophy is ambiguous. On some occasions, he appears to invoke the cause of market reform by noting “serious imbalances” in the Chinese economy. On others, he has lauded China’s state-heavy system of “market socialism” for giving the government direct control over the economy. Over the past year, Wen provoked a great deal of comment and speculation when he spoke, on several occasions, of the need for greater political reform in China. Some have even postulated an internal rift within the Party, with Wen leading a democratic reform camp against hardliners led by Wu Bangguo and Zhou Yongkang (a theory that gained momentum when Wu seemed to contradict Wen’s softer line in their speeches at this year’s NPC). Nevertheless, Wen has never clarified what he actually means by “political reform,” and the practical difference between Wen and the others’ positions may be far less than imagined.

In any event, given that they have little more than a year left in their terms, neither Hu nor Wen are likely to exert a dominant influence over the Party’s future for very much longer.

Xi Jinping is expected to replace Hu as China’s paramount leader. Xi, age 57, is a so-called “princeling,” the child of a prominent Party official. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was a leading Communist revolutionary who served as Deputy Prime Minister in the early 1960s before being purged by Mao in the Cultural Revolution. After he was rehabilitated by Deng Xiaopeng, the elder Xi served as governor of Guangdong, where he proposed and implemented China’s first “special economic zone” in Shenzhen and emerged as a vigorous advocate of market reform. He once told Deng that “We need to reform China and implement this economic zone even if it means that we have to pave a bloody road ahead and I am to be responsible for it.” Xi Zhongxun later publicly condemned the violent crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

His father’s legacy would seem to place Xi Jinping firmly in the camp of political and economic reform. However, some friends have suggested that the younger Xi endured his family’s humiliation during the Cultural Revolution by becoming “redder than red” — a devoted Party loyalist. (Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once described Xi as “a thoughtful man who has gone through many trials and tributions,” even comparing him to Nelson Mandela). An engineer and Tsinghua graduate like Hu, Xi has learned – throughout steady rise up the ladder, including key provincial posting to the prosperous coastal provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Shanghai — to keep his cards close to his vest. By and large, he has stayed away from scandal or controversy, focusing on Party-approved campaigns to combat corruption. As a result, Xi’s inner mind, and the priorities he would pursue once in power, remain largely a mystery, at least to outsiders.

Xi is married to one of China’s most famous singers, Peng Liyuan, making her an unusually visible First Lady. Their daughter is currently enrolled at Harvard under a pseudonym.

Li Keqiang, age 55, is expected to succeed Wen as Premier, China’s top policymaker and Xi’s #2. He comes from a far more humble background than Xi — his father was a local official in the poor, rural province of Anhui — but earned a law degree from Peking University, as well as a PhD in economics. In the process, he rose to a top leadership position in the Communist Youth League, Hu Jintao’s main power base, where he became a key protégé of Hu. In 1998, Li became China’s youngest-ever governor when he was appointed to run the rural, heavily-populated province of Henan. His tenure there was marred by several damaging incidents, including a horrendous scandal involving the spread of AIDS through carelessly contaminated blood, which tagged him with a reputation for “bad luck.” His success at improving Henan’s economy, however — along with Hu’s patronage — earned him a promotion to Party Secretary in Liaoning, where he championed ambitious plans to revive the province’s struggling rust-belt economy.

There is a widespread belief that Li was Hu’s preferred pick as successor, but that he lost out to Xi in the ensuing power struggle. Even after Li became Deputy Premier, and Wen’s presumed successor, speculation still raged that rivals such as Wang Qishan and Bo Xilai (see below) were angling to push him aside and claim the prize for themselves. Critics covertly drew attention to Li’s past troubles in Henan and the shadow of ”bad luck” hanging over his reputation. However, a series of successful foreign trips, in which Li performed well, appears to have bolstered his position and cleared the path for him becoming China’s next premier.

Wang Qishan is currently a member of the full Poliburo (but not the Standing Committee) and serves under Wen as Vice Premier in charge of economics and finance. A history student in college, Wang — somewhat in contrast to Li — has a reputation as a real “can-do” guy. In the 1990s, as president of China Construction Bank (CCB) and deputy governor of the nation’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), he helped reorganize China’s banks to cope with a major bad debt crisis. After Beijing’s mayor screwed up the city’s response to the SARS epidemic in 2003, Wang was tapped to replace him and clean up the mess. He went on to manage the city’s highly successful 2008 Olympics. Wang currently serves as President Hu’s special envoy to the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), where he has received kudos from foreign counterparts like US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, who called Wang “decisive and inquisitive” with “a wicked sense of humor.” Given Wang’s stellar track record, it’s no wonder that many saw him — and many believe he saw himself — as a strong candidate to succeed Wen as Premier, even after Li was designated the heir-apparent. One strike against him, however, was his age: now 62, Wang would only be able to serve a single five-year term before reaching the mandatory retirement age. While he probably won’t win the #2 spot, it’s likely that Wang will be a highly influential player on the new 9-man inner circle for the next several years.

Bo Xilai is emerging as the big wildcard in the upcoming leadership transition. Like Xi, Bo — now serving as the Party secretary of Chongqing – is a “princeling,” but Bo is considered a “crown prince among princelings.” His father, Bo Yibo, was a Long March veteran who later opposed Mao over the Great Leap Forward; during the Cultural Revolution, the elder Bo was tortured and his wife (Bo Xilai’s mother) was beaten to death. Bo Yibo later emerged as one of the “Eight Immortals,” the seniormost PLA generals who were instrumental in backing Deng Xiaoping. In contrast to Xi’s father, Bo’s father was one of the key hardliners behind the imposition of martial law in 1989.

Handsome, articulate, and media-savvy, Bo Xilai is sometimes referred to as China’s Kennedy. As mayor of Dalian in the 1990s, Bo was credited with managing a remarkable renaissance of the then-decaying port city. In 2003, Bo — who graduated in history from Peking University, and is married to a prominent lawyer – took over as Minister of Commerce, where he dazzled his foreign counterparts. Although Bo, now age 61 and a member of the full Politburo, has had an impressive and high-profile career, he so far has been unable to break into to the real inner circle of power — possibly due, in part, to resentment over his charismatic personal style and his willingness to court the media and the public. Admiring profiles of him in the Western press have certainly not won him any friends among China’s more conservative powerbrokers.

When Bo was sent to Chongqing, an urban province of 31 million, as Party boss in 2007, it was seen as his “make it or break it” moment. There’s no doubt he has used it to make an impression. Whether it’s his ruthless crackdown on the city’s mafia (in which a few defense lawyers were thrown in jail for good measure) or his ambitious (and costly) plans to build huge swaths of subsidized housing, Bo has been making news. He has also perplexed Western admirers with a populist campaign aimed at reviving the spirit (if not the chaos) of the Cultural Revolution, including “red songs” and “red text messages” praising Chairman Mao — a rather odd, and some say cynical, maneuver given his tragic family history. Nobody knows quite what it all adds up to, or how Bo far will run with it, but he’s made himself impossible to ignore. Last December, Xi Jinping paid a visit to Chongqing and publicly praised Bo’s neo-Maoist movement.

It may be that Bo’s recent activities, and antics, have earned him a place on the 9-man Standing Committee — if only to make sure this volatile politician is, as we used to say in the Army, “inside the tent pissing out, rather than outside pissing in.” If so — and such a conclusion is far from certain — he will be one of the most interesting people to watch in the next few years.

Obviously there are many other personalities involved in the upcoming transition, even if we look no lower than the possible candidates to fill the top nine slots on the Standing Committee. But for simplicity’s sake, it’s best to focus on these six. I’ll only make one further, broader observation. The 2012-13 transition represents a handoff from the so-called “4th generation” to the “5th”. The first two generations, led by Mao and Deng, were dominated by the generals and cadres who fought in the Communist revolution. The next two, led by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, were dominated by engineers, who rose to power under Soviet-style central planning but adapted, more or less readily, to market reform as a path to “modernize” China. Out of the current 9-man Standing Committee, seven are engineers, one (Wen) is a geologist, and only one (Li) is a lawyer/economist. While the next President, Xi Jinping, is an engineer, most of the 5th generation expected to serve immediately under him studied law, economics, or history — disciplines that may offer a different perspective on the challenges China faces.

Virtually all of the new generation of leaders, however, completed their studies in China, unlike their children (typified by Xi’s daughter at Harvard, or Bo Xilai’s son at Oxford) who in many cases have studied and even worked or taught abroad. I’ve been told, by several of my Tsinghua students, that studying abroad — while highly desirable from a money-making perspective — is still regarded as a career-killer for anyone hoping to rise within the Party. It will be interesting to see, after a new generation of “princelings” returns to China with Western diplomas in hand, whether this will continue to hold true, and what new perspectives these returnees will bring to Chinese politics.

明天就解散 @ WHAT, 080913

还是没能实现多机位..


新2 & To Here Knows When


新3

新5


新1


新4

由于某种奇妙的原因 Google给出的related videos 全都是蜡笔小新系列
形如
蜡 笔 小`新 2`
蜡 笔 小`新 5`

=-=-=
貌似有不能加载的bug 请点击视频下链接观看

中國才不是新納粹主義的土壤

被閹割是一個精妙的比喻 也是一個唯有我們天朝上國之人才能理解的比喻

雖然閹割行為在中世紀歐洲 印度 中東和非洲都有歷史記載
但是 針對非戰俘、奴隸群體的集體"閹割制度" 還是以中國封建宮廷最為著名

于是 對于閹人這一特殊社會階層的屬性 對于被閹割這一象征符號的含義 自然是國人對其之理解最為深刻

值得慶幸的是 盡管制度化的閹割行為已經在中國消失百余年 但上述象征符號所代表的精神品質與性格特征仍然在我們天朝的國土上廣泛的生存著